ASIL
Insight Six-Party
Talks Produce Action Plan on North Korean Nuclear Disarmament By
Christopher J. Le Mon
March
6, 2007
Volume 11, Issue 5
On
February 13, 2007, the governments taking part in the fifth
round of the Six-Party Talks concerning nuclear disarmament
of North Korea released an action plan designed to lead to
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (February 13
Action Plan).[1] China,
Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and North Korea
(formally called the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, or DPRK) agreed to specific initial actions and timetables
that support the objectives of terminating and eliminating
North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program.
This Insight describes the February 13 Action Plan and its
implications for international law.
Background to the February 13 Action
Plan
The February 13 Action Plan builds upon a
previous joint statement issued after the fourth round of
the Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005 (September 19 Joint
Statement), according to which North Korea “committed
to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”[2]
Efforts to achieve this objective were set back by North Korea’s
July 2006 missile firings over the Sea of Japan[3]
and its October 2006 announcement of a successful underground
test of a nuclear weapon.[4]
These North Korean actions led to Security Council Resolutions
1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), condemning the actions
and making certain legally binding decisions,[5]
including that North Korea “shall abandon all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable
and irreversible manner[.]”[6]
The fifth round of the Six-Party Talks reconvened in December
2006, and the third session of the fifth round, held in Beijing,
produced the February 13 Action Plan.
The February 13 Action Plan
By the terms of the February 13 Action Plan,
North Korea agreed that, within 60 days, it would “shut
down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the
Yongbyon nuclear facility,” where it had manufactured
and reprocessed plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.[7]
In exchange, the five parties agreed to provide North Korea
with up to one million tons of fuel oil and other economic
and humanitarian assistance, and Japan and the United States
pledged to move toward normalizing relations with North Korea.
The Action Plan also announced the establishment of five Working
Groups tasked with discussing and formulating “specific
plans for the implementation of the [September 19] Joint Statement[.]”[8]
The Action Plan does not immediately obligate
North Korea to abandon its plutonium nuclear weapons program,
only to “freeze” it, and it does not impose any
immediate obligations concerning North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program utilizing highly enriched uranium.[9]
In addition, North Korea agreed to “invite back”
inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in order to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications
related to the shutting down and sealing of the Yongbyon facility,
but this commitment was qualified by language indicating that
the scope of such inspections will be “agreed between
IAEA and DPRK” at a later date.[10]
The February 13 Action Plan does not address
the status of North Korean membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). North Korea joined the NPT in 1985. In
2002, it ousted IAEA inspectors from its nuclear facilities
and, in 2003, announced its withdrawal from the NPT.[11]
Security Council Resolution 1718 contained a demand that North
Korea “return to the [NPT],”[12]
and, although North Korea committed in the September 19 Joint
Statement to “returning” to the NPT “at
an early date,” the February 13 Action Plan does not
contain any provisions on this issue.
The February 13 Action Plan and International
Law
The parties to the Action Plan have made political commitments
to take specific steps toward North Korea’s disarmament,
but the Action Plan does not constitute a treaty creating
legal obligations. For an international agreement to
be considered a treaty, the parties must enter into the agreement
with the intent that international law governs it.[13]
The February 13 Action Plan is an unsigned recitation of “initial
actions” for implementing the non-binding September
19 Joint Statement, and the Action Plan contains no indication
that the parties intended to create international legal obligations.
Moreover, the only concrete measures are the shutting down
and sealing of North Korea’s Yongbyon facility and the
provision of an initial 50,000 tons of fuel oil to North Korea.
The remaining actions listed in the Action Plan are procedural,
such as the commitments by Japan and the United States to
start bilateral talks with North Korea on normalizing relations,
or involve the establishment of working groups to carry out
the Action Plan’s provisions. The political nature of
the February 13 Action Plan means that it is not subject to
international legal rules governing treaties, such as rules
on remedies for violations or on interpretation of treaty
provisions.
Additionally, the Action Plan cannot be construed
as containing statements from any party that might be binding
under international law. The Action Plan involves heavily
negotiated commitments finalized in a form that reveals the
parties’ intention not to be bound by international
law. For a statement or declaration to create international
legal obligations, the state in question has to make the statement
with the intent to be bound by it under international law.[14]
Given the negotiated, reciprocal commitments in the February
13 Action Plan and the lack of any reference to legal obligations,
North Korea’s pronouncements in the February 13 Action
Plan do not bind North Korea under international law.
All six parties to the February 13 Action
Plan remain, however, bound by other rules of international
law in their mutual relations, including the UN Charter, relevant
treaty law, and customary international law. In particular,
the six parties remain bound by Security Council Resolution
1718, which, among other things, imposed economic sanctions
against North Korea and required North Korea to take certain
steps toward nuclear disarmament.[15]
For China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States,
normalizing trade and economic relations with North Korea
would require the Security Council to lift economic sanctions
currently in place under Resolution 1718. Similarly,
North Korea remains legally bound to abide by the demands
of the Security Council in Resolution 1718, which require
it to abandon its nuclear weapons, suspend all ballistic missile
activities, and end all other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs.[16]
Although not a binding international agreement,
the February 13 Action Plan is an important and substantial
step toward the goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program, and if implemented, it would move North Korea
toward compliance with the binding demands for WMD disarmament
made by the Security Council.
The next round of
Six-Party Talks is scheduled to take place on March 19, 2007.
About
the author
Christopher
J. Le Mon, an ASIL member, is an Associate in the Washington,
D.C. office of Shearman & Sterling LLP, and formerly served
as law clerk to Judges Thomas Buergenthal and Vladlen S. Vereshchetin
at the International Court of Justice.
Footnotes
[1] “Initial
Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,”
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm
(Feb. 13, 2007) (hereinafter “February 13 Action Plan”
or “Action Plan”).
[9]
The termination of the nuclear weapons program based upon
highly enriched uranium program does appear to be a subject
for subsequent negotiations between the parties. See
February 13 Action Plan, para. II(2) (“The DPRK will
discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs
as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted
from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the
Joint Statement.”).
[14]SeeNuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, para.
46 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J.
457, para. 46 (Dec. 20). See also Le Mon, supra
note 4 (arguing that no statements in the September 19
Joint Declaration created international legal obligations
on North Korea).
Copyright
2007 by The American Society of International
Law ASIL
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