On January 21, 2016, the European Court of Human Rights (Court) ruled (judgment only available in French) that Greek authorities had treated a criminal complaint lodged by a human trafficking victim in a manner incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). According to the press release, the case concerned L.E., a Nigerian national who was brought to Greece by K.A., who confiscated her passport and forced her into prostitution after their arrival in Europe. After having filed for asylum, L.E. brought a criminal complaint against K.A. and his partner D.J. arguing, “that she was a victim of human trafficking and accused these two persons of forcing her, and two other Nigerian women, into prostitution.” Over five years later, the Greek authorities apprehended D.J., and the trial eventually found “that she had been another of K.A’s. victims and that he had been sexually exploiting her too.” The Court noted that Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labor) of the Convention imposes a positive obligation on states to protect victims of human trafficking. L.E. had been classified as a victim of human trafficking, but was required to wait for nine months before authorities officially granted this status. The Court found that this time period was not “reasonable” and constituted a breach of the duty to protect L.E. The Court further criticized the judicial proceedings, noting the lack of prosecutorial effort and the mismanagement of the case file. Additionally, “the evidence did not indicate that the police had taken further tangible steps to find him and bring him before the courts, other than entering his name in the police criminal research file. Nor had the authorities established contact or instigated cooperation with the Nigerian authorities in order to arrest the suspect.” The Court concluded that Greece had violated its procedural obligations under Article 4. It further found that Greece had violated Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) because “the length of the proceedings in question had been excessive for one level of jurisdiction and had not met the ‘reasonable time’ requirement.”