Terrorism

In the second week of September 2007, leading U.S. military and diplomatic officials provided long-awaited reports to Congress and the President on U.S. political and military activities in Iraq. These hearings focused attention on how much progress U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts have made in Iraq. Although debate surrounding these events centered on the question of the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the testimony and hearings connect the ongoing attempts by the U.S. government to adjust to the challenges presented by waging COIN campaigns.

On July 7, 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism[1] enters into force. July 7 is the 30th day after the receipt of the 22nd instrument of ratification (from Bangladesh), which the Convention required for its entry into force (Article 25.1). This Insight describes this Convention and its place in the global efforts underway to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism.

Background to the Convention

Recently, David Hicks, an Australian interned for over five years in Guantanamo Bay, became the first individual sentenced under the newly-constituted Military Commission process. Hicks pleaded guilty to one count of intentionally providing material support to al-Qaeda in the context of an armed conflict against the U.S.[1] and will be repatriated to Australia to serve a further nine months of imprisonment.

In a number of recent judgements, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) has considered actions seeking annulment of two European Community measures adopted pursuant to different counter-terrorism regimes established by the United Nations Security Council. A Community Regulation transposing the sanctions regime created by Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) into Community law and directly linked to the list maintained by the UN Sanctions Committee has only been subjected to limited review.

In Hamdan v.

Thirty years ago this month, a Cuban airliner blew up in mid-air, killing all 73 people aboard.

The recent conflict in Lebanon and Northern Israel, occurring between a state and a non-state armed opposition group on the territory of a state that has not itself taken up arms, raises distinct challenges for interpretation of international law related to armed conflict.

Introduction

I. Introduction

As has been well documented,[1] the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) some time ago lost confidence that Iran's nuclear program is being carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes as required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation